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THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE CONDUCT OF CANADA - U.S.
RELATIONS
Fmr. AmbassadorAllan Gotliebt

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW INSTITUTE
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
LONDON, ON
OCTOBER 4, 2007
I am honoured to be invited to speak to you as the inaugural lecturer at the
Canada-U.S. Law Institute distinguished speaker forum. The subject of my
talk today is the role of law in the conduct of our relations with the United
States.
Thanks to its size and intensity, no relationship between any two
sovereign countries is more complex than that between Canada and the
United States. For this reason, the University of Western Ontario and Case
Western Reserve University showed great prescience and leadership in
establishing the Canada-U.S. Law Institute. I congratulate you on your
contributions, over the years, to a better understanding of so many of the
difficult legal issues that continually arise between our two societies.
I have had the honour to know many of the distinguished Canadian and
American scholars and statesmen who have participated in your work over
several decades. The partnership and spirit of close collaboration you have
created between two important North American institutions serves as an
exemplar of how to address our common issues. Professionalism, scholarly
discussions, joint undertakings and studies, non-partisanship, bi-national
collaboration - these are the key ingredients of a model approach to dealing
with our trans-national issues.
t Former Canadian Ambassador to the United States and Undersecretary of State for
External Affairs. Senior Advisor to Bennett Jones LLP.
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Beyond knowing many of your distinguished participants from both sides
of the border over the years, I have another personal connection to your
institute. I note from your recent annual report that the William H. Donner
Foundation was an early financial supporter of your conferences.' I have the
honour to serve as chairman of the Donner Canadian Foundation, 2 a sister
institution of the U.S. body, both of which were established over a halfcentury ago by the U.S. steel magnate William H. Donner.3 I am delighted
that the U.S. foundation has supported your endeavours.
I myself have been associated with Canadian-U.S. issues for many years to be exact, for a half-century. It was fifty years ago precisely that I joined
the Department of External Affairs 4 - as it was then known - and shortly
thereafter, I was assigned to the legal division, a tiny band consisting of a
handful of warm bodies, which, however, was twice the size of the U.S.
division, consisting of only two warm bodies. 5 Those were the days.
I subsequently moved in and out of the legal stream, serving later as the
head of the Legal Bureau, legal adviser, Undersecretary, and finally
Ambassador to Washington. 6 In all these tasks, Canada-U.S. relations
remained at the forehand of my responsibilities.
Early on, I formed some very distinct views on how best to conduct our
relations with the United States. For a quarter of a century, I was very
sceptical about the utility of law and bilateral institutions and mechanisms in
conducting relations between us.
But as you will note, I came to a very different view after having served
in Washington. The sceptic about the role of law turned into a convert. And
the reason why is the theme of my lecture today.
To understand my personal odyssey, I want to take you back to the early
years of the post-war era. These critical decades were, of course, the years of
Remarks occurred at an event entitled Canada-United States Law Institute Distinguished
Lecture, held on October 4, 2007.
About
the
Institute:
History,
Canada-United
States
Law
Institute,
http://cusli.org/about/history.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
2 See
The
Trilateral
Commission:
Allan
E.
Gotlieb,
http://www.trilateral.org/membship/bios/ag.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
3 See The William H. Donner Foundation, Inc: About William H. Donner,
http://003bdld.netsolhost.com/aboutwilliam.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
4 See About the Department, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/gotlieb-bio-en.asp (last visited Apr.
7, 2008) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs]; see also Gotlieb, Allan Ezra, The Canadian
Encyclopedia,
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA000333
0 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
5 See Diplomacy: Speaking for Canada, CAN. WORLD VIEW, Issue 24, Winter 2005,
availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.calcanada-magazine/issue24/04-title-en.asp.
6 See Foreign Affairs, supra note 4.
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explosive growth in the relationship and its expansion into the largest twoway economic relationship in the world.7
In the fledging Department of External Affairs, during the years of the
Second World War and thereafter, there was no great love of international
law and international lawyers.8 One might speculate about the reasons but I
believe they were the legacy of the9 failure of the League of Nations and
international law in the interwar era.
The Covenant of the League was rightly seen as a document dominated
by legalistic norms and prescriptions.' 0 Peace was to be achieved, according
to the Covenant, "by the firm establishment of the understandings of
the
international law."" Even more dramatically, great powers, through
12
instrument of the Kellogg-Briand peace pacts, abolished war forever.
It soon became evident that this reliance on law created complacency and
cloaked the reality that war was becoming inevitable. It came to be seen that
the international rules, indiscriminately violated, were futile - at best pious
norms and at worst deceptions passed off on a pacifist public unwilling to
arm in their own defence.
At the heart of the Covenant was the famous Article 10, which guaranteed
the territorial integrity of all its members against "external aggression."' 3 But
the drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately avoided making U.N.
enforcement action conditional on any violation of international law. In a
historic shift, mandatory enforcement action required only the determination
Council of the existence of a "threat to the peace" or "breach
by the Security
' 14
of the peace."
The practitioners of diplomacy in the Canadian Foreign Service were well
attuned to the political approach enshrined in the Charter.
As a participant in the Department's puny legal division, a decade after
the Charter took effect, I can testify to how marginal legal considerations
were in the Canadian approach to maintaining peace and security. The
7 See Allan Gotlieb, Bring Back the Special Relationship, THE NAT'L POST, Aug. 17,
at
available
2007,
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2007/08/17/allan-gotliebbring-back-the-special-relationship.aspx.
8 See generally EDGAR MCNNIS, CANADA 496 (Ayer Publishing 1971) (discussing
Canada's cautious policy following the war).
9 See generally id. (noting the failure of the League's collective system).
1o See generally JOHN O'BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 739 (Routledge Cavendish 2001)

(noting the complicated and legalistic provisions in the Covenant).
1" See LASSA OPPENHEIM & RONALD ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 281

(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 3d ed. 2005).
12 See O'BRIEN supra note 10, at 739.
13 See OPPENHEIM & ROXBURGH supra note 11, at 268.
14 See F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE

HISTORY FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES 337 (Cambridge University Press, new ed. 1967).
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practitioners of diplomacy in Canada's golden age were skilled conciliators
and architects of compromises and brokered solutions. They were not writers
of new rules for the very good reason that they had lived through that era
during which more rules were proclaimed and broken than perhaps at any
other time in history.
The culture of favouring diplomacy, not law, was nowhere better reflected
in how we collectively dealt with problems arising out of our sharing a
continent with the United States.
With the exception of the International Joint Commission, 15 International
Joint Commission, the P.J.B.D. 16 and NORAD, 17 and a short-lived attempt at
establishing joint cabinet committees between our two governments,' 8 the
world's closest and deepest two-way relationship was governed by ad hoc
methods. "Ad hocery" was the hallmark of the era.
The merits of this approach had no more committed advocate than myself.
The attitude in favour of pragmatism and diplomacy was articulated in the
first address I gave in the United States just before I took up duties as
ambassador in the fall of 1981. Talking to the biennial meeting of The
Association of Canadian Studies in the United States ("ACSUS") in East
Lansing Michigan, I devoted the whole of my remarks to explaining how this
massive relationship of ours was managed - and indeed was best managed without the support of bilateral institutions, bilateral machinery, and a
grander legal framework.
I speculated that Canadians were somewhat "suspicious of bilateral
institutions because of the different weights and sizes of the two countries."
But, I pointed out the U.S. itself has never been a "demander" of Canada in
terms of creating new bilateral institutions. Both sides would, I said, find
unhelpful a "creeping institutionalization" whose net effect would be to
encumber the process of conducting bilateral relations."
15 See

International

Joint

Commission:

Who

We

Are,

http://www.ijc.org/en/background/biogr-commiss.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (defining its
purpose as preventing and resolving disputes between the United States and Canada).
16 See National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Backgrounder The Permanent Joint
Board on Defence, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroomlview-news-e.asp?id=298 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2008); see also JOHN HERD THOMPSON & STEPHEN J. RANDALL, CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES 152 (University of Georgia Press, 3d ed. 2002)
(noting the PJBD was the military version of the International Joint Commission).
17 See National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Backgrounder NORAD,
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view-news-e.asp?id=1922 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008);
see also THOMPSON, supra note 16 (describing NORAD, North American Air Defense
Agreement, as a defense production sharing agreement).
18 See generally DIMITRY ANASTAKIS, AUTO PACT: CREATING A BORDERLESS NORTH
AMERICAN AuTo INDuSTRY 1960-1971 158 (University of Toronto Press, 2005) (noting U.S.
and Canadian officials met for annual joint cabinet committee meeting on trade and economic
affairs).
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In conclusion, I called for a premium to be continued to be placed on
flexibility, a pragmatic approach to the use (or non-use) of institutions, and a
heavy reliance on traditional diplomatic, and conciliatory methods.
If a defining characteristic of our relationship during the decades after
World War 11 was the absence of dispute mechanisms and special machinery,
how does one account for the remarkably smooth functioning of the
relationship in those years?
The answer, I think, is that this was the era of the special relationship
between our two countries.
Because of closely shared values, both of us looked at the world in a very
similar fashion and worked together to resist threats to peace, security and
freedom. Canada made enormously heavy defence expenditures in those days
- as high as 40% of the federal budget in the mid 1950s' 9 - and was an
architect of NATO, 20 and close western collaborator in the fight against
Soviet expansion. 2'
In the Cold War, Canada's northern 'real estate' was seen as especially
significant from a geopolitical standpoint, 22 given our ownership of the
landmass separating the two super powers.
Hence, U.S. strategic interests could be understood as virtually dictating
special consideration for Canada. Even more significantly, there was a sense
of trust and friendship. For example, when the U.S. considered nominees for
the post of first Secretary General of the U.N., two Canadian civil servants
23
topped the list: Lester Pearson and Norman Robertson.
19 See THOMPSON, supra note 16.

20

See

generally YONATAN

RESHEF &

SANDRA RASTIN,

UNIONS IN THE TIME OF

170 (University of
Toronto Press, 2003) (noting Canada is an architect of the Western alliance).
REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING IN ALBERTA & ONTARIO

21 See generally ROBERT BOTHWELL, IAN M. DRUMMOND & JOHN ENGLISH, CANADA SINCE

1945: POWER, POLITICS, AND PROVINCIALISM 88 (University of Toronto Press, Rev. ed. 1989)
(discussing Canada's approach to confronting "the problem of Soviet expansion").

22 See e.g., David Neufeld, Commemorating the Cold War in Canada: Considering the

DEW Line, 20 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 9, 13 (Winter 1998) (explaining Canada's role in the Cold
War by erecting the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, which was a "part of a continentwide system lending credibility to the retaliatory nuclear threat used by the United States and
NATO to contain feared Soviet Aggression"); see also Ann Denholm Crosby, A MiddlePower Military Alliance: Canada and NORAD, 34 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH 37, 38 (1997)

(discussing the Canadian military role in the North American Aerospace Defence Agreement
(NORAD), where "[m]ainstream analyses of Canadian defence policy is determined by the
historical, geostrategic, economic, and political factors that predict its alliance arrangements,
and by those alliances themselves. This means in the context of the air/aerospace defence of
the continent during the Cold War when a Soviet attack on the USA would have been through
or over Canadian airspace, Canadian governments were unable to adopt defence postures that
might run counter to the interests of the USA.").
James Barros, Pearson or Lie: The Politics of the Secretary-General'sSelection, 1946,

10 CAN. J. OF POL. SCi. 65, 67 (Mar. 1977) (discussing Edward R. Stettinius' opinion, the
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The record shows that the U.S., on a number of occasions, was willing to
subordinate its economic interests (as they perceived them) to the larger
purpose of maintaining good relations with Canada. It seems at times that it
was the policy of the United States not "to treat Canada like any other
foreign government."
For example, Canadian oil imports into the U.S. were granted an overland
24
exemption from restrictions on foreign imports of oil into the United States.
In this same period, when President Kennedy imposed an interest
equalization tax on investment abroad, the special relationship meant that
when Canada protested, once again we got an exemption. The U.S. on some
occasions refrained from applying its pernicious extraterritorial laws on
trading with the enemy to our trade with China in trucks and machinery.26
When serious countervailing issues arose as a result of duty remission
schemes for the manufacture of automobiles in Canada, it was the U.S. that
proposed to Canada that we consider an automotive agreement for tariff-free
trade between our two countries in the automotive sector. 27 It then used its
power and influence to help obtain GATF approval.2 8 Thus, in 1965, the auto
pact was born.29

American representative in the United Nations Preparatory Commission, in discussing the
selection of Secretary-General: "The first choice of the American government... should be the
Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman A. Robertson. There were,
however, other persons who might have been considered: Lester B Pearson...").
24 Thomas W. Zeiler, Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade Doctrine, 64 THE Bus.
HIST. REv. 286, 289 (Summer 1990) ("The program limited imports to 9 percent of estimated
domestic demand but exempted Canada and Mexico from quotas in order to maintain their
safely imported, overland supplies.").
25 Robert L. Maines, The Interest Equalization Tax, 17 STAN. L. REv. 710,
720 (Apr.
1965) ("In a joint Canadian-American statement on July 21, 1963, it was agreed that new
Canadian issues would be exempt from the tax...,"discussing the Interest Equalization Tax
and the power of the President to exempt foreign securities by Executive order).
26 I.A. Litvak & C.J. Maule, Conflict Resolution and Extraterritoriality,13 J. OF CONFLIcT
RESOL. 305, 310 (Sep. 1969) ("On May, 1959, it was announced in Parliament that US
authorities had lifted the restrictions applied to Canadian trucks carrying Communist Chinese
goods in bond through United States territory.").
27 See generally Key Economic Events 1965 - Canada-United States Auto Pact,
Government
of
Canada,
http://www.canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/1965canada-us-auto-pact.html
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2008) ("The Auto Pact eliminated trade tariffs between the two countries and
created a single North American manufacturing market. Tariffs between the two countries
were eliminated on cars, trucks, buses, tires and automotive parts.").
28 See ANASTAKIS, supra note 18, at 119 ("In the end, the waiver passed, on 19 December
1965. The most important reasons for this outcome begin with the fact that the U.S.
government puts its full weight behind the request and used the Kennedy Round as a carrot to
push other countries towards further tariff reduction.").
29 Key Economic Events, supra note 27.
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In 1971, when the Nixon administration and its Secretary of the Treasury
John Connolly imposed a surcharge on all imports into the U.S. in order to
address its unfavourable balance of payment, (the famous "Nixon Shokku")
Canadian protests were once again heard and the surcharges for Canadian
imports into the U.S. were lifted.3 °
Absolutely key to an understanding of the special relationship is that it
corresponded in time not only with the Cold War but also with the period of
the imperial presidency. The Congressional role was distinctly subordinate to
the administration.3' We looked to the administration to keep the Congress in
line. Moreover, the powers of Congress were exercised in a disciplined way
by the dominant congressional leaders.
Nothing better illustrates the relationship of the time - and the changes
that were soon to take place - than the memoirs of Arnold Heeney, our
ambassador to Washington twice during these years. 32 Heeney wrote that he
did not have to deal with economic issues in his time.33 They were not on his
agenda. Nor did he lobby the Congress. 34 Nor did a Canadian ambassador
until decades later.35 We followed the rules by the book: the Congress, being
an internal organ of the government, was off limits.
30 See Richard Veatch, Review: [Untitled], 19 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 388 (Jun. 1986)
(reviewing PETER C. DOBELL, CANADA INWORLD AFFAIRS, 1971-1973 471 (Canadian Institute
of International Affairs 1985)) (stating, "[t]he 10 per cent surcharge on imports into the Unites
States, the measure about which Canada was most concerned, was lifted in December 1971,
and it had not had the drastic short-run effects in Canada which had been anticipated").
31 See WILLIAM BUNDY, A TANGLED WEB: THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON

PRESIDENCY 383(I.B. Tauris 1998) (stating "Congress had been out of play during the fall
because of the election campaign, and in the new year reconvened just as the Paris Agreement
was being concluded. Despite the Democratic majorities in both houses, many in Washington
felt at the time that Nixon had so much prestige that the Nixon presidency was now more
powerful than any since Johnson's 1965 honeymoon or Eisenhower's first years.").
32 Library and Archives of Canada, Behind the Diary, Arnold Danford Patrick Heeney
(1902-1970),
Library
and
Archives
of
Canada,
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/king/05320113/053201130454_e.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2008) ("He was Canada's Ambassador to the United States twice, 1953 to 1957 and 1959 to
1962.").
33 See JACOB RYTEN, THE STERLING PUBLIC SERVANT: A GLOBAL TRIBUTE TO SYLVIA
OsTRY 7 (Mc-Gill-Queen's Press 2004) ("Arnold Heeney, Canada's Ambassador to
Washington in the late 1950's, reported to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that there were no
economic issues between Canada and the United States at the time.").
34 See generally Brian Bow, "When in Rome," Comparing Canadian and Mexican
Strategiesfor Influencing Policy Outcomes in the United States, 65 CAN.-AM. PUB. POL'Y 1,
20 (Jan. 2006) (describing how Heeney "reluctantly resorted to calling the Senate Majority
Leader," as the only occasion he felt it necessary to go directly to the Hill).
35 See Robert Wolfe, See You in Washington?A PluralistPerspective on North American
Institutions, 9 IRRP CHOICES 14 (Apr. 2003) (discussing how, in the 1960s, foreign diplomats
preferred "quiet and regular consultation," but that during the years of Reagan, a new role was
established: "the diplomat as public advocate").
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On one occasion some senators from the mid-west were sponsoring a bill
that would have caused a diversion of the waters of the great lakes, to
Canada's great detriment.3 6 Heeney went to the State Department to
complain, in accordance with traditional diplomatic practice. 37 The senior
State Department official told him he could do nothing.
"Complain to the Congress," he told him. "Who should I see?" the
ambassador asked. "Lyndon Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader," was the
reply. "Will you make the appointment?" Heeney asked. "Yes" was the
response. Heeney made the call, told Johnson that he had a problem and
explained it. Johnson then said, "No boy, you don't have a problem." "What
do you mean?" said Heeney, "I just explained it." Johnson replied "and I just
fixed it."
Then came the Trudeau era, and in the U.S., Vietnam and Watergate.
There was a sense that the threats of the Cold War were receding and the
need for alliance solidarity diminishing. Among Canadian elites, the
conviction grew that we needed to assert more vigorously our independence
from the Americans on the global stage.
Accordingly the Trudeau government introduced the "third option" aimed
at reversing the movement towards greater economic interpretation between
our two nations. It also adopted foreign ownership policies ("FIRA) 38 and
national energy policies (Petro Canada, N.E.P.) 39 aimed at asserting our
independence on the global stage and reducing our dependency on the United
States.
With this change of direction, it was inevitable that the very notion of a
"special relationship" was deemed inappropriate and fell from favour.
But the Trudeau policy in favour of establishing the "ordinariness" of the
Canada-U.S. relationship - assumed to be a sign of our new maturity, failed
to take account of deep and important political changes underway in the
United States.
Ironically, we proclaimed our view that special consideration for our
interests was no longer necessary at the very moment when we were going to
need it more, i.e. when Congress was reasserting its jurisdictional primacy in
the area of external trade.4 °
36 See generally Bow, supra note 34, at 20.
37 id.
38 See J.L. GRANATSTEIN &

ROBERT BOTHWELL,

PIROUETTE:

PIERRE TRUDEAU

AND

FOREIGN POLICY 72 (University of Toronto Press 1990) (discussing the
establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency because of the enlargement of
Trudeau's "natural tendencies towards intervention in the management of the economy.").
39 See id. at 315 (discussing the government's attempt to "assure" Canadian oil supply).
40 See Martha Liebler Gibson, Managing Conflict: The Role of the Legislative Veto in
American Foreign Policy, 26 POLITY 441, 442-443 (Spring 1994) (stating that more than half
of the legislative veto provisions written into domestic and foreign policy statues were
CANADIAN
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Ottawa was out of touch with the revolution in governance that was
taking place in Washington in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. As the
presidency was weakened, so was party discipline. 4 1 A new crop of younger
post Watergate congressmen came to Washington, eager to exert power and
influence.
Decision-making in Congress became fragmented and atomized as the
spectre of protectionism cast a deep shadow over the corridors of Congress.
New trade legislation gave U.S. bodies far-reaching powers to investigate
and retaliate, if there was perceived discrimination against U.S. and
services. 42 Section 201 and 301 actions and anti-dumping and countervails
mushroomed to the point where almost nothing that came from under the
ground or grew on top of it or moved in the sea escaped attack.43
Because of the weakened presidency and the fear of decline in U.S.
industrial primacy, the era was over when the U.S. would subordinate its
economic interests to its geopolitical goals."a Prominent senators trumpeted
this fact to foreign audiences.45
Truth to tell, Ottawa was not the only one out of touch with the hanging
political realities in the United States. I was too. Today I find it hard to
explain why.
After all, it was on my watch as Undersecretary that the historic CanadaU.S. fisheries agreement failed to come to pass. This was because of the
opposition of only one senator.46

Under the direct authority of President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau, special ambassadors succeeded in negotiating a radical
resource treaty that would have created a new bilateral institution to manage
jointly all species of fish exploited on the Northern Atlantic East Coast.47

incorporated in the 1970s, with 80 legislative vetoes "enacted between 1975 and 1978 alone").
41 See John LeBoutillier, The Death of Party Discipline, NEWSMAX, May 21, 2001,
http://archive.newsmax.comlarchives/articles2001/5/21154822.shtml (discussing that after
Watergate, many Republican candidates for Congress proclaimed themselves independents
and viewed party loyalty negatively).
42 See Cletus C. Coughlin, U.S. Trade-Remedy Laws: Do they Facilitate or Hinder
Free
Trade?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis REv. July-Aug. 1991, at 3, 8-13, available at
httfp://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/91/07/Trade-Jul-Aug 1991 .pdf.
3 Id. at 7-9.
44 See e.g., Jonathan Clarke, America, Know Thyself, NAT'L INT., 1993/1994 Winter, at 19.
45 id.
46 See U.S. Moves on Fish Treaty Upset Ottawa, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 7, 1981, at Climate
of Past Special Issue.
47 See Henry Giniger, DisputesAwait Reagan on Canada Trip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1951
at A3.
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It was perhaps, to that date, the most ambitious economic agreement ever
signed by our two governments in the post-war era. And it died in the Senate
thanks to the scallop-catching constituents of one or two senators.48
With the failure of this historic agreement, it became obvious, or should
have been, that Canada could not rely on a powerful U.S. presidency to
resolve Canada-U.S. issues or better manage them without the support of
Congress.
As Canadian ambassador to Washington, I rapidly became conscious of
the power of senators and congressmen to originate legislation that could
have far-reaching effects on our relationship. I realized that Congress had not
just legislative but co-executive powers. 49 This was my first and most
enduring lesson.
I became convinced that we needed a stronger legal foundation to support
our rapidly integrating economies. Accordingly, I enthusiastically
participated in Mulroney's historic shift in our approach to Canada-U.S.
relations.
Breaking with the past, the Mulroney government ushered in a new era in
the management of our relationship. Although not originally in favour of a
comprehensive free-trade agreement with the U.S.,
the Mulroney government
50
changed gears twelve months after its election.
The achievement of a free-trade agreement with the United States was my
principal preoccupation in Washington for two years. (If you want a day-byday harem-scarem account, let me put a plug-in for my recently published
diaries. 5 1)
The free-trade agreement proposed by the Mulroney
government was,
52
without question, a radical departure from the past.
A) It established a new rules-based framework to support the
phenomenal flows
of trade and economic activity between our
53
two countries.
B) The free-trade zone was to be bilateral in nature. On a one-on48 U.S. Moves on Fish Treaty Upset Ottawa, supra note 46, at A3.
49 See generally, James Kuhnhenn, GAO Suit is Latest Clash Between Legislative,
Executive Branches, KNIGHT RIDDER/'rRIB. NEws SERVICE, Feb. 25, 2002, at 1-4.
50 See generally Carol Goar, The 'Blueing' of Canada, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 31, 1987 at

A16.
5

ALLAN GOTLIEB, WASHINGTON DIARIES:

1981-1989 (McClelland & Stewart Ltd. 2006).
Goar, supra note 50.
53 See Andrew F. Cooper, Good Global Governance or Political Opportunism?Mulroney
and UN Social Conferences, in DIPLOMATIC DEPARTURES: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA IN
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1984-93 160, 170 (Nelson Michaud & Kim Richard Nossal eds.,
2001).
52
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one basis, we were seeking a closer economic embrace from
our neighbour to the south. 54 Ottawa did not have a more
extended North American or Western Hemisphere agreement
in mind. It was a preferential regime for Canada and the
United States.
C) It was to include all sectors of the economy with the exception
of culture 55
- that meant investment, services, energy, and other
resources.
D) Trade remedies were to be abolished or restrained.56
E) New institutional arrangements were to be entered into to
settle disputes - the first innovative proposal in the
institutional field in half a century or more of our bilateral
relations.57
Despite the degree of hostility in the Congress (at one time approximately
40 senators were opposed to the Accord), many of our goals were largely
achieved.5 8 The result was a huge increase in the free flow of goods,
investment, and services across our boundaries with exports tripling in scale
and, softwood lumber notwithstanding, a significant falling
59 off in the number
of U.S. Trade actions initiated against Canadian exports.
But the evolution of North American trade since that time revealed that
there were problems in going further in the direction of a deeper rules-based
integration and common institutions.
First, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement soon evolved into a
trilateral accord, the North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA, in
54 See generally Denis Stairs, Architects or Engineers? The Conservatives and Foreign
Policy, in DIPLOMATIC DEPARTURES: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY,

1984-93 25, 30-33 (Nelson Michaud & Kim Richard Nossal eds., 2001).
55 See e.g., Tammy L. Nemeth, Continental Drift: Energy Policy and Canadian-American
Relations, in DIPLOMATIC DEPARTURES: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA IN CANADIAN FOREIGN

POLICY, 1984-93 59, 65 (Nelson Michaud & Kim Richard Nossal eds., 2001).
56 See generally Brian W. Tomlin, Leaving the Past Behind: The Free Trade Initiative
Assessed, in DIPLOMATIC DEPARTURES: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA IN CANADIAN FOREIGN
POLICY, 1984-93 45, 48-52 (Nelson Michaud & Kim Richard Nossal eds., 2001).
57 See, e.g., Claire Turenne Sjolander, Adding Women but Forgetting to Stir: Gender and
ForeignPolicy in the Mulroney Era, in DIPLOMATIC DEPARTURES: THE CONSERVATIVE ERA IN
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1984-93 220, 231 (Nelson Michaud & Kim Richard Nossal eds.,

2001).
58 See Clyde H. Farnsworth, CanadianPact Voted By Senate,, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998
at D1.
59 See generally Daniel T. Griswold, Editorial, By Every Reasonable Measure, NAFTA
Has Been a Success, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Dec. 27, 2002, at 39.
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which Mexico shares a privileged market-access position into the United
States. 6° Canada lost its unique status. But the problems and challenges in the
Mexican-U.S. relationship were very different from ours and, I believe, much
more intractable. 6'
Second, the free trade agreement fell short of what needed to be attained.
There were no agreed rules in the critical area of what constitutes a subsidy;
there were serious weaknesses in the dispute settlement provisions; much
work needed to be done to embrace unfettered free trade in such areas as
agriculture and forest products and to facilitate the free movement of peoples
across boundaries.62
Thirdly, neither the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement nor its successor,
NAFTA, contained within it the dynamic necessary to lead to its own
improvement. Unlike the European Community, there were no internal
mechanisms to spur momentum towards deepening and widening the
common economic space our countries were forging.6 3
The consequences for Canada would not have been so serious had the
events of September 11, 2001 not taken place. The effect was transformative.
National security soared to the top of the U.S. agenda to an unprecedented
degree, and an era was born in which defence of the homeland trumped all
other concerns. 64 New obstacles began to arise impeding cross-border
commerce and the movement of peoples. The Canada-U.S. border began to
thicken.
The Chr6tien government struggled to address the issues through its
'smart border' negotiations with the U.S. This effort evolved into the much
broader trilateral process launched in Waco, Texas: the Security and
Prosperity Partnership, through which the three North American states
sought to address the vast array of regulatory and security
obstacles that
65
stood in the way of deepening our common economic space.

60
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Challenges, GLOBE & MAIL, July 11, 1994.
61 See generally id. (explaining certain unique NAFTA issues that Mexico and Canada had
with each country's respective relationship with the United States).
62 See Jessica K. Hodges, When Enough is Too Much: The Threat of Litigation NAFTA's
Constitutionality and a Lost Chance to Examine Undue Process in Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Determinations, 15 GEO MASON L. REv. 201, 219 (2007), available at
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/gmulawreview/issues/15- l/documents/Hodges.pdf.
3 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Gustavo Vega- Cinovas, Whither NAFTA: A Common
Frontier?, THE REBORDERING OF NORTH AM.? INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION IN A NEW
SECURITY
CONTEXT
(forthcoming
2003)
(manuscript,
available
at
httg://iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauerl202.pdf).
See e.g., Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton, Reviewing our Defenses, Four Years
After 9/11, THE FORWARD, Sept. 9, 2005, at 1.
65 See Richard Tomkins, Analysis: North America partnership,UPI, Mar. 23, 2005.
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The effort continues to this day. Judging by what is happening at our
borders, the process has been moving very slowly, if it is moving at all. It has
lacked the leadership, energy and momentum necessary to achieve results.
Now, thanks to the Congressionally-inspired Western Hemispheric travel
initiative with its requirement for overland passport controls, Canada and the
U.S. are at risk of reversing the great historic trend towards reducing the
significance of the border in our national life.66
So where do we go from here?
We should pursue a deeper and more comprehensive rules-based
framework for our economic and security relations. Our goal should be
nothing less than a North American community of law. Only in this way can
we reduce political arbitrariness in settling disputes and disinvesting our
economic interests.
With a minority government in Canada and a lame-duck administration in
the United States heavily preoccupied with Iraq, you would be right in saying
that this is not the most propitious time for grand initiatives or possibly even
for modest ones.67

But, the relationship between Ottawa and Washington has significantly
improved since the election of Stephen Harper's government. 68 Moreover,
our formidable commitment to fight terrorism in Afghanistan has
substantially increased good will towards Canada both in the White House
and on The Hill and among both Republicans and Democrats.6 9
Why not propose to the United States that we begin to explore ways to
advance our respective national interests through the further development of
special bilateral machinery, consultative arrangements, and rule making?
We could at least try to make some progress in this direction. For
example, our two governments could:
1. Commit to convene official annual summits between the President
and the Prime Minister. These began in the Mulroney-Reagan
years and were highly productive. 70 For unknown reasons, the
66 See Doug Struck, Rush of Passports seen in Canada, U.S.; New Rules Set to Tighten
Security, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2007, at 29A.

67 See generally Tim Harper, U.S. Won't Budge on Khadr; Ahead of Next Week's Talks by

Bush, Harper, Calder6n, White House Signals Canadian to Face Tribunal at Guantanamo,

THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 18, 2007, at A13 (President Bush's political capital has long been
exhausted and he has been consigned to lame duck status).

68 See Canada-U.S.Relationship gets Warmer; Change in Ottawa Brings Change in D.C.,
GUELPH MERCURY, Apr. 26, 2006, at A7.
69 See Jeff Sallot, Canadian Troops May Not go to Iraq, But to Afghanistan, THE GLOBE

AND MAIL, Feb. 5, 2005, at A10.
70 See Martin Cohn, SUMMIT/Leaders No Longer Sing Same Tune Stakes High for PM in
Talks with Reagan, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 24, 1988, at B5.
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practice lapsed. Summits of this nature increase dramatically the
focus and priority that Canadian issues would receive at the
highest echelons of the U.S. system.7 1
2. Establish special procedures for the preparation of these summits,
under the control and direction of the two leaders.
3. Reinstitute the commitment to hold quarterly meetings of our
Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, established in
the Reagan years, but, again for unknown reasons, allowed to
lapse. 72 This was a unique feature of U.S. diplomatic practice. It
guaranteed 'quality time' for top officials to get their counterparts
to focus on their grievances and concerns.
4. Adopt the same practice for ministers in other key areas - e.g.,
energy, the environment, defence, and law enforcement.
5. Develop a protocol between our two governments, which would
define principles for cooperation. For example, require that prior
notification and opportunity for consultation would be provided
with regard to any initiative that could have an adverse impact on
the other's interests.
Given the fact that, as with the Western Hemispheric Travel
Initiative, so many of our problems originate in the Congress,
obtaining such an agreement would be very meaningful for
Canada.73 Admittedly, such a commitment will not be easily
obtained. But it would also be of substantial
benefit to the United
74
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6. Appoint personal envoys or czars, answerable directly to the
President and Prime Minister, to take hold of the entire process of
border facilitation.

71 Id.
72

Id.

73 See generally Jim Harper, U.S.-Imposed Border Bedlam Will Hurt Michigan, DETRorr

NEws, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.cato.org/pub.display.php?pub-id=9128
(discussing the problems in the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative).
74 Cohn, supra note 70 (discussing the importance of a strong relationship between the
United States and Canadian leaders).
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7.

Establish the principle that new bilateral institutions should be
created to plan, maintain and oversee the openness of our borders.
Vast consequences hinge on how well they are managed.
Unilateral decision-making affecting the principal choke points
should be brought under the responsibility of new trans-border
commissions with effective powers.
There is more than a whiff of the 19th century in how we
currently go about our business of border management. 75 The
International Bridge at Buffalo / Fort Erie is an example. Years
pass and the problems of congestion, insufficient infrastructure,
and security remain unresolved: too many players, too many
jurisdictions, too little planning, and too much unilateralism.
Almost a century ago, the International Joint Commission was
formed by Britain and the U.S. to manage issues relating to our
international boundary waters.76 A century later, our approach to
management of the land frontiers remains mired in obsolete
notions of sovereignty.77

8. Mandate special envoys to begin planning for the negotiation of a
new comprehensive agreement to create a single economic and
security space embracing our two countries. This should include
adopting a common external tariff, rules of origin, and customs
union, strengthening dispute-settlement,
abolishing trade
remedies, establishing a common competition policy, creating a
common security perimeter, and furthering the free movement of
people across our boundaries. 78
In other words, a community of law.
Could such an agreement be obtained? Only with great patience and
difficulty. But our free-trade experience shows that in the Congress big
75 See NAFTA Lacks a Sense of Community, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 23, 1998 (unilateral
actions have the potential to create serious disputes).
76 IJC.com,
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http://www.ijc.org/en/background/biogr-commiss.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
7 See e.g., Editorial, Stop Bridge Delay: United States, Canada must Resolve Harmful
Impasse on BoarderSecurity, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007.
See generally Danielle Goldfarb, The Road to a Canada-U.S.Customs Union: Step-byStep or in a Single Bound?, C.D. HOWE lNSTrruTE COMMENTARY, July 1, 2003 (discussing the
options for a bi-national customs union).
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initiatives can have a greater chance of success than small ones. 79 This is
because there are more interests in play, more trade-offs
80 available, and more
ones.
local
trump
to
interests
national
for
opportunities
In order to ensure our sovereignty and independence, the Canada-U.S.
relationship must be based on a stronger and more comprehensive regime of
law. We should recognize this and make its attainment our highest foreignpolicy priority.

79 See C. Fred Bergsten, Globalizing Free Trade: The Assent of Regionalism, FOREIGN
AFF., May-June 1996, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19960501faessay4203/cfred-bergsten/globalizing-free-trade-the-ascent-of-regionalism.html.
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